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1.3 
 
Foucault’s History of Neoliberalism 
 
Nicholas Gane 
 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, there has been renewed interest in 
thinking critically about the pro-market form of governance known as 
neoliberalism. Foucault’s 1978-9 lectures at the Collège de France – translated 
into English under the title The Birth of Biopolitics – have been central to this 
task. For, in spite of their title, these lectures have no explicit connection to the 
study of biopolitics, but instead map the emergence of different national 
trajectories of neoliberal reason from the mid-twentieth century onwards. These 
lectures are one of Foucault’s few historical excursions into the twentieth 
century and are also remarkable because of their timing: Foucault delivered 
them at the point that neoliberalism was be rolled out as a concrete 
governmental form in the United Kingdom and United States, and they were 
published in English at the height of the financial crisis in 2008. For these 
reasons, these lectures have attracted a mass readership, and have led many to 
return to Foucault’s work in order to think historically and critically about the 
neoliberal present.  
The reception of these lectures, however, has not always been positive, as 
some have questioned the motives behind Foucault’s interest in neoliberalism 
and with this the political commitments, more generally, of his later work. 
Readers of these lectures have fallen into two main camps: those, on the one 
hand, that treat them as a valuable resource for understanding the historical 
basis and complexities of neoliberal reason, and those, on the other, that think 
Foucault devoted a series of lectures to the study of neoliberalism because he 
was attracted to many of the ideas in question. These lectures have, as a 
consequence, become a contested site for thinking about Foucault’s political 
commitments and legacy, and for considering, more generally, the grounds upon 
which it is possible to engage critically with the neoliberal project.1 
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This chapter will argue that while Foucault’s biopolitics lectures are of 
value for analysing the formation and operation of neoliberal reason, 
nonetheless they should be read critically as, among other things, they provide a 
partial history of neoliberalism that contains many gaps and inaccuracies. It is 
important to remember that these lectures are just that: lectures that were 
written up on a weekly basis and never intended for publication in their present 
form. Because of this, it is necessary to treat these lectures not as Foucault’s final 
word on neoliberalism, but as openings onto a complex set of histories that have 
taken on a new significance in the post-crisis present. On this basis, the chapter 
proceeds in three parts: first, it provides an overview of the key points of 
Foucault’s history of liberal and neoliberal governance; second, it points to a 
number of gaps and blind spots in this history; and third, it provides an 
assessment of the value of Foucault’s biopolitics lectures for thinking historically 
and critically about different trajectories of neoliberalism that are still very much 
alive today. 
 
Towards a Genealogy of Neoliberalism: The Birth of Biopolitics 
 
Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics, which were delivered at the Collège de France 
on weekly basis from January to April 1979, open with an analysis of the liberal 
‘art’ of government, and document a shift from the raison d’État of the Middle 
Ages to new forms of liberal governmentality that emerged in the late-eighteenth 
century. This shift was underpinned by a change in the structural relation of the 
state to the market, for whereas under the raison d’État markets were subject to 
strict forms of governmental regulation, by the end of the eighteenth century, 
they had started to appear as something that ‘obeyed and had to obey “natural”, 
that is to say, spontaneous mechanisms’.2 In early liberal texts such as Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations [1776], Foucault observes, the market was conceived 
less in terms of regulation and justice, but treated rather as a site of truth or 
‘veridiction’. This, he argues, signals the beginning of a different relationship 
between the state and market in which the market, increasingly, is freed from 
the powers of the state and is left to regulate itself, while the state is called upon 
to place limits on the scope and reach of its activities. 
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But how can the state impose limits upon itself? One philosophical 
answer to this problem is to prioritize questions of law, and, more specifically, to 
forge new concepts of right and sovereignty (an approach Foucault ascribes to 
Rousseau). Another is to analyze the rationale, reach and extent of government 
in order to establish its ‘de facto limits’. Foucault is more interested in the latter 
of these approaches and focuses on utilitarian philosophies that sought to 
overturn the previous raison d’État by redefining the government in terms of its 
utility. What emerges in such approaches is a reconfiguration of the relation of 
the state to the market in which, paradoxically, new freedoms are granted to the 
latter through the application of a model of discipline. Foucault argues, for 
example, that for markets to operate freely or for the existence of property rights 
there must be government in the form of ‘control, constraint, and coercion’.3 
Hence, while classical liberalism is, on the surface, framed by a call for the self-
limitation or ‘frugality’ of government, as in the work of Adam Smith, it is more 
than simply an argument for laissez-faire economics. Rather, the question it 
seeks to address is how the state should govern the market in order to guarantee 
its freedom. 
Foucault again outlines two main approaches to this problem. First, there 
is the solution provided by Bentham’s model of the Panopticon, whereby 
‘government, initially limited to the function of supervision, is only to intervene 
when it sees that something is not happening according to the general mechanics 
of behaviour, exchange and economic life’.4 Second, there are more direct 
strategies of government that have ‘the function of producing, breathing life into, 
and increasing freedom, of introducing additional freedom through additional 
control and intervention’.5 Foucault cites Roosevelt’s welfare policies of the 
1930s as an example of such practice; something that he returns to in his 
lectures on American neoliberalism (see below). Foucault’s immediate concern, 
however, is for Bentham’s Panopticon, which, he claims, is ‘not a regional 
mechanics limited to certain institutions’ but instead is ‘the very formula of 
liberal government’.6 Expanding the arguments of his earlier Discipline and 
Punish, he explains that the Panopticon is more than simply a prison-based 
architecture of discipline and punishment. Rather, it is a normative model of 
governance that recasts the connection between the state and the market by 
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promoting conditions of economic freedom through the exercise of disciplinary 
techniques of surveillance. In this model the state is to create the conditions for 
the free operation of the market while watching over it and intervening only in 
the last instance: surveillance of the market is seen to be regulation enough. 
In the following lectures, Foucault documents the reworking and, to a 
large extent, rejection of these classical liberal ideas by new forms of liberal 
thought that emerged in the mid-twentieth century. He begins with German 
neoliberalism, and focuses on a group of political economists associated with the 
journal Ordo, founded by Walter Eucken in 1948. Foucault observes that the 
main challenge for this group was how to reconstruct the German state following 
the horrors of the Second World War. Their answer was to reconceive of the 
state as an economic rather than a political entity, or, in Foucault’s words, to 
treat state formation as a form of ‘commercial opening’. Foucault argues that this 
approach reverses the liberal model of the Panopticon, for rather than the state 
watching over the market, the market is now called upon to produce legitimacy 
for the state, which in turn is redefined as the market’s ‘guarantor’. Underpinning 
this new arrangement is a ‘permanent genesis’ or ‘circuit’ that goes ‘constantly 
from the economic institution to the state’ and is designed to ensure the 
‘guaranteed exercise of an economic freedom’.7 The question this begs is how can 
a state be founded upon, and yet at the same time be limited by, a principle of 
economic freedom? The answer provided by ordoliberalism is that market 
principles should not merely give the state its underlying rationale, but be used 
to regulate its powers and actions more generally. Foucault explains:  
instead of accepting a free market defined by the state and kept as it were 
under state supervision – which was, in a way, the initial formula of 
liberalism . . . – the ordoliberals say we should completely turn the 
formula around and adopt the free market as an organizing and 
regulating principle of the state, from the start of existence up to the last 
form of its interventions. In other words: a state under the supervision of 
the market rather than a market supervised by the state.8 
At the heart of ordoliberalism, then, is a radical rethinking of the what the state is 
and how it should be positioned in relation to the market: the free market 
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economy is to serve as the ‘principle, form, and model’ of the state and provides 
the benchmarks for redefining and evaluating all of its activities. 
The figure of the market thus becomes all-important in this type of new 
liberal thought. Foucault argues that for classical liberal economists such as 
Adam Smith, the market was theorized in terms of free exchange between 
trading partners, but that the ordoliberals broke with this approach by 
conceiving of the market both in terms of exchange and competition. This has 
important consequences, for against late-nineteenth-century ideas of 
competition as a biological fact, the ordoliberals argued instead that neither 
competition nor markets are natural; instead they have to be made. This is a key 
point of departure from laissez-faire or libertarian forms of economic thought as 
the state is now seen to be able to play a key role in making competition, and 
markets more generally, work.  Foucault states: 
Government must accompany the market economy from start to finish. 
The market economy does not take something away from government. 
Rather, it indicates, it constitutes the general index in which one must 
place the rule for defining governmental action. One must govern for the 
market, rather than because of the market. To that extent you can see that 
the relationship defined by eighteenth-century liberalism is completely 
reversed.9  
German neoliberalism, or what Foucault calls ordoliberalism, thus does not call 
for the withering of the state or for small government, but rather for government 
invention and a strong state of a certain kind. Ordoliberalism is an argument for 
the state to be subjected to principles of marketization, and for government to be 
active in ensuring that competition plays a ‘regulatory role at every moment and 
every point in society’ by ensuring the ‘general regulation of society by the 
market’.10 Under these conditions, market principles are everything and 
everywhere, and nothing, conceivably, remains sacred. Indeed, as Foucault 
observes, the question for ordoliberalism is now less what the market can and 
cannot touch, but how it should touch domains and objects that previously were 
out of its reach. 
Foucault considers the ‘diffusion’ of this ordoliberal model of 
neoliberalism in France11 before turning to a quite different trajectory of 
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neoliberal reason that is specific to the United States.12 He argues that 
neoliberalism in the US can be traced to the liberal critique of the interventionist 
policies associated with the New Deal, the Beveridge plan, and government 
programmes on poverty, education and segregation that emerged from the late-
1940s onwards. There are, he observes, commonalities between the emergence 
of neoliberalism in Europe and the US, as these strands of neoliberal thinking are 
united by an aversion to Keynesian economics and to centralized forms of 
‘planning’. But there are also crucial differences: first, in the US there was no 
prior raison d’État to respond to as ‘economic claims’ and a certain type of 
economic liberalism were central to American independence from the outset; 
second, that, as a consequence, the ‘question’ of liberalism has been ‘the 
recurrent element of all the political discussions and choices of the United 
States’13; and third, particularly from the mid-1940s onwards, both the political 
Left and the Right developed sharp critiques of the powers of the state. 
Foucault does not consider the importance of this historical context in 
detail but instead addresses the theoretical basis of American neoliberalism by 
focusing on ideas of human capital that are associated with the work of Gary 
Becker. Foucault argues that these ideas are rooted in a critique of Marxist 
theories of labour for being too abstract in their concern for general economic 
processes. Neoliberal economics responds by shifting attention to the capacity of 
individuals to allocate scarce means in order to make concrete choices between 
different outcomes or ends, and work (rather than labour) becomes one such 
choice. This move redefines economics so that it is focused on ‘the internal 
rationality of…human behaviour’ and on the analysis of individual activities 
rather than broader social and economic processes.14 In so doing, the figure of 
homo economicus, which is central to classical forms of political economy, takes 
on a new life. In a key passage, Foucault explains: 
In neo-liberalism – and it does not hide this; it proclaims it – there is also 
a theory of homo economicus, but he is not at all a partner of exchange. 
Homo economicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. This is 
true to the extent that, in practice, the stake in all neoliberal analyses is 
the replacement every time of homo economicus as partner of exchange 
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with a homo economicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his 
own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.15 
There are parallels here with Foucault’s account of German neoliberalism, which 
documents a move beyond exchange to a universal norm of competition that 
comes from the market and is injected into all forms of social and cultural life. 
But at the core of American neoliberalism is something perhaps more disturbing: 
the birth of a subject that can be reduced to a form of capital and individualized 
according to its choices and behaviours. Such an approach carries with it a 
political suggestion: that individuals, as entrepreneurs of themselves, are best 
left to their own devices, meaning that state support in the form of welfare is no 
longer necessary.16 
Foucault argues that this new conception of homo economicus is part of a 
broader movement towards the understanding of all forms of human life through 
principles drawn from the analysis of the market economy. He states that this 
idea that economic analysis can be applied to ‘non-market relationships and 
phenomena’17 can be traced to Ludwig von Mises’s key work Human Action. In 
fact, this idea comes from an earlier work by Mises on the epistemological basis 
of economics in which it is argued that all forms of human action obey an 
economic principle.18 But Foucault’s point still stands: what is at stake here is an 
‘inversion’ in the relation of the social to the economic so that the latter always 
takes priority as an explanatory force. Foucault argues that this is the key feature 
of American neoliberalism as it involves ‘the generalization of the economic form 
of the market. It involves generalizing it throughout the social body and 
including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or 
sanctioned by monetary exchanges’.19 Foucault argues that this development 
narrows our ‘grid of intelligibility’ as now everything, seemingly, is cast in 
economic terms. Indeed, there appears to be no limit to the application of this 
neoliberal ‘economic grid’: from the analysis of crime as something which ‘makes 
the individual incur the risk of being sentenced to penalty’20 through to 
relationships between mother and child, which can ‘be analyzed in terms of 
investment, capital costs, and profit – both economic and psychological profit – 
on the capital invested’.21  
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Historical Limits 
 
Foucault’s account was groundbreaking in its attempt to map different 
trajectories of German and North American neoliberalism from the mid-
twentieth century onwards. At the time these lectures were delivered, few 
sensed the importance of the neoliberal project and what, from the early-1980s 
onwards, was to come. But in spite of their brilliance in exploring the 
epistemological basis of new forms of liberalism that broke in important ways 
with the nineteenth-century model of political economy, there are clear limits to 
Foucault’s analysis, and in particular to his model of classical liberalism and to 
his genealogy of the early neoliberal project. That there are limits to these 
lectures is to be expected given that they were written at short notice and never 
intended for publication. For this reason, Foucault’s biopolitics lectures should 
not be embraced or rejected tout court as they provide valuable insights into the 
complex trajectories of neoliberal reason, while at the same time calling for 
further work. The question this poses is how can they be extended and refined to 
produce a fuller and more nuanced critical history of neoliberalism. With this in 
mind, the following are some of the keys gaps and problems in these lectures 
that can be used as starting points for thinking through and beyond Foucault’s 
account: 
 
1. Foucault’s history of liberalism jumps from Bentham’s writings on the 
Panopticon at the end of the eighteenth century through to the emergence 
of ordoliberalism in post-War Germany with little consideration of the 
history that lies in between. Because of this, he misses important 
epistemic shifts that took place through the latter decades of the 
nineteenth century through the course of which political economy was 
displaced by the disciplines of economics, in one direction, and sociology 
in another. This omission is not unique to Foucault’s biopolitics lectures, 
as his earlier Order of Things traces the formation of modern economic 
thought only as far as the 1830s and Ricardo’s theory of value.22 In the 
biopolitics lectures, however, Foucault develops an ideal-typical 
characterization of liberalism from the work of Bentham that is based 
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upon an over-simplistic model of state-market surveillance. This model 
might have heuristic value for teaching (in a lecture environment) but 
does little to capture the full range and complexity of early liberal 
understandings of the state, the market, and the relationship between the 
two. Indeed, on such questions the key figure is, arguably, not Bentham 
but John Stuart Mill: the most prominent figure in nineteenth-century 
political economy23 who provided a new understanding of the market as 
something social rather than natural.24 Mill divided later neoliberal and 
libertarian thinkers25, some of whom, most notably Hayek’s mentor 
Ludwig von Mises, accused him of corrupting the liberal project with 
socialist ideals. Oddly, Mill, even though he formulated the very idea of 
the homo economicus, is nowhere mentioned by Foucault. If, however, 
neoliberalism is born out of a rejection of classical liberal ideas, as 
Foucault suggests, then it is necessary to trace the development of the 
liberal canon from Smith through Ricardo, Bentham and other figures 
such as Malthus forward into the mid-19th century and beyond. It is only 
by doing so that the neoliberal dissatisfaction with earlier liberal 
understandings of the state and market become clear, and hence what is 
new or neo- about the positions advanced by figures such as Hayek by 
way of response. 
 
2. While Foucault makes occasional references to the work of von Mises and 
Hayek, he largely neglects the Austrian trajectory of neoliberal thought. 
This trajectory is important as it based upon, among other things, a 
critique of neoclassical principles of perfect competition, market 
equilibrium (as something that can be proved mathematically), and the 
figure of homo economicus. Hayek, in particular, advances an 
epistemology different to that found within German and American 
neoliberal thought as he argues that the tacit rationalities of individual 
economic actors are necessarily limited and can only be co-ordinated by 
the ‘marvel’ of the market. These ideas, in turn, involve an important but 
neglected relationship with the discipline of sociology. Foucault identifies 
Max Weber as a key figure in the history of neoliberalism as his work was 
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developed in opposite directions by the Freiburg and Frankfurt Schools 
(the former identifying economic solutions to social irrationalities and the 
latter the reverse). This claim, however, not only overplays the 
connection between Weber and ordoliberal thought but also overlooks 
the fact that Weber developed his ideal-typical methodology from Carl 
Menger: a key figure in Austrian economics whose work deeply 
influenced Hayek.26 Hayek, in turn, attempted to produce the first English 
translation of the first chapter of Economy and Society, and both he and 
his mentor, von Mises, developed individualistic economic philosophies 
based largely on a critical reading of this text.27 These developments, 
which underpin a neoliberal epistemology that seeks at all costs to 
prioritize economic principles over social concerns, are missing from 
Foucault’s account, which, as stated above, barely touches on the period 
between the decline of political economy at the end of the nineteenth 
century and the Second War World. This is a problem because this is 
precisely the period in which neoliberal economics was born. 
 
3. Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism is predominantly discursive in 
basis and thus pays little attention to the ways in which neoliberal ideas 
and policies are mobilized and put into practice. This leaves the task of 
explaining how the economic and political rationalities of different 
trajectories of neoliberalism are materialized into concrete governmental 
forms. Foucault draws attention to the importance of the Walter 
Lippmann Colloquium, at which the term ‘neoliberalism’ was coined, but 
neglects the organizational development of neoliberalism beyond this 
point. Nowhere, for example, does he mention the organization that grew 
out of this event, the Mont Pèlerin Society, which was founded by Hayek 
in 1947. This Society was, and for that matter still is, the global think-tank 
to champion the neoliberal cause.28 Such think-tanks have played a vital 
role in connecting the seemingly esoteric and abstract arguments of 
figures such as Hayek to the interests of big business and to the concrete 
concerns of front bench politics.29 For this reason, it is necessary to move 
beyond Foucault by paying closer attention to the institutional basis of 
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neoliberal governance, and to the political mechanisms through which 
ideas are drawn out of discourse and are turned into governmental 
practices. 
 
4. Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism is restricted both in terms of its 
origin story and the present to which it now speaks. For while Foucault’s 
account captures the main features of American neoliberal thought as it 
stood in 1979, much has changed since. Although this is not the place to 
explore the contemporary form and operation of neoliberal reason in any 
detail, it is worth pointing to one development, in particular, that lies 
beyond the reach of Foucault’s lectures: financialization. This is the 
subject of Wendy Brown’s recent work Undoing the Demos, in which she 
argues that a Foucauldian account of neoliberalism must now consider 
‘the rise of finance capital, the financialization of everything, and the 
importance of debt and derivatives in shaping the economy and political 
reason as well as transforming neoliberal rationality itself – its 
formulation of markets, subjects, and rational action’.30 Brown adds that 
is also necessary to confront new ideas of human capital that cast states 
and individuals in the image of firms, and which promote new forms of 
subjectivity based upon financial principles of speculation, leveraging and 
risk-taking. It is only by addressing such developments, and thereby 
moving beyond the historical limits of Foucault’s account, that a critical 
history of different trajectories of neoliberal reason can be extended into 
the present. 
 
Where Now? 
 
The question this leaves is whether, in spite of their limits, Foucault’s lectures on 
neoliberalism continue to be of value for thinking critically about neoliberalism 
today? This question has divided readers of Foucault’s later work31, with some 
arguing that the biopolitics lectures are the starting point for a historical and 
critical engagement with the basis of neoliberal reason, and others that they 
were motivated by an attraction to the neoliberal ideas they document. This 
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latter position is advanced by Philip Mirowski, who argues in Never Let a Serious 
Crisis Go To Waste that while these lectures ‘drew out stunning implications’ of 
the work of key neoliberal thinkers such as Gary Becker, they stopped short of 
analysing neoliberalism ‘on the ground’, and accepted a neoliberal view of the 
unbridled powers of ‘the market’. Mirowski argues that the main problem with 
Foucault’s biopolitics lectures is that they fail to question the neoliberal 
conception of the market as the ‘sole legitimate site for the production of 
indubitable knowledge of the whole’.32 He adds: ‘If I had to summarize where the 
otherwise prescient Foucault took a wrong turn, it was in too readily swallowing 
the basic neoliberal precept that the market was an information processor more 
powerful and encompassing than any human being or organization of humans’.33 
Mirowski’s position, by way of response, is to insist that the first step in any 
critique of neoliberalism must be to question the neoliberal view of ‘the market’ 
as a site of truth and power; something, he claims, that Foucault did not do in his 
lectures on biopolitics. 
 Mirowski is not the only figure to cast doubt on the underlying politics of 
Foucault’s biopolitics lectures. In 2012, François Ewald - Foucault’s former 
assistant and one of the main editors of his Collège de France lectures – 
participated in a seminar with Gary Becker at the University of Chicago. Ewald 
surprised both Becker and the audience by remarking that Foucault’s biopolitics 
lectures should be read as an ‘apology of neoliberalism’ in general, and as a 
statement of support for the work of Becker in particular.34 While figures such as 
Maurizio Lazzarato and Jacques Donzelot have responded by dismissing Ewald’s 
view out of hand, others have taken them seriously and have argued that 
Foucault’s later work was attracted to the neoliberal cause. The key text here is 
Zamora and Behrent’s edited collection Foucault and Neoliberalism, which, 
implicitly, extends many of the criticisms of Foucault advanced previously by 
Mirowski. Michael Behrent sets the tone of this volume by arguing at the outset 
that Foucault’s ‘attraction to neoliberalism was real’ and that his ‘neoliberal 
moment’ can only be understood in relation to the ‘broad shift of allegiances that 
transformed French intellectual politics in the 1970s’.35 More specifically, 
Foucault is said to have been drawn to neoliberalism for the following reasons: 
he was critical of social security as an exercise of biopower (a position, it is 
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argued, that places him close to Milton Friedman36); he developed a non-juridical 
and anti-Marxist conception of power that shared affinities with the approach of 
key neoliberal thinkers; he ‘appreciated’ the non-anthropological approach of 
economic liberalism37; he was suspicious of the powers of the state; he believed 
neoliberalism could teach the political Left how to govern; and he sympathized 
with the writings of ‘New Philosophers’ such as André Glucksmann.38  
  There is a common strategy that underpins many of the criticisms 
advanced by Mirowski, Zamora and Behrens and which is worthy of immediate 
comment: the tendency to read Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism as a 
normative commitment to the ideas under study. Mirowski, for example, argues 
that the main problem with Foucault’s lectures is that they sympathize with the 
neoliberal figure of the market as the site for the production of all forms of truth 
and legitimacy. Nowhere, however, in the actual text of the biopolitics lectures is 
this apparent. Rather, Foucault provides a historical account, first, of how the 
market is constituted as a site of veridiction in early forms of classical liberalism, 
and secondly, of how ordoliberalism understands markets and competition as 
things that have to be made. There is no argument here for the sovereignty of 
‘the market’, but rather an analysis of the discourses that have made such 
understandings and commitments possible. Similarly, Behrent argues that 
Foucault’s ‘liberal moment’ was inspired by ‘economic liberals like Adam Smith, 
Wilhelm Röpke, and the Chicago School’.39 But, again, where in the text of the 
biopolitics lectures does Foucault display any sympathy for the ideas of these 
thinkers? The problem is that because Foucault does not openly dismiss the 
grounds of neoliberal reason in his biopolitics lectures, these are consequently 
read as a statement of support rather than of critique. But to write the history of 
a form of reason is not necessarily the same thing as supporting it or giving it 
legitimacy. Here, it is important to reflect on the value of genealogy as a critical 
method, and to consider the importance of thinking historically about the 
neoliberal present. 
 One of the most valuable aspects of the historical work that underpins 
Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics is that it refuses to treat neoliberalism as a single 
discursive entity and instead maps out different trajectories of neoliberal reason 
that have distinct political and epistemological commitments. Neoliberalism is a 
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messy and hybrid form of political reason that has varied both in its conception 
and application within different national and historical contexts.40 This is 
important, first, because neoliberalism contains its own fracture lines that can 
potentially be exploited by those positioned on the political Left; and secondly, 
the recognition of neoliberalism as a form of political reason demands for it to be  
treated as a serious political and epistemological project rather than dismissed 
out of hand as mere ideology. Indeed, by refusing to dismiss neoliberalism as 
shorthand for anything associated with free markets and the political Right, 
Foucault poses the question of how this form of reason works to redefine the 
state and individual subjectivities through the economization of the social, and 
why, moreover, it has proved so effective.  
Rather than turn to Foucault for answers, it more productive to use the 
biopolitics lectures to pose such questions, and to do so, as Serge Audier has 
argued, it is necessary to ‘stop constructing Foucault as a provider of political 
dogmas and prescriptions – something he never wanted to be’.41 Foucault’s work 
is of value because it provides a detailed understanding of the emergence, 
development, and workings of neoliberal reason and, rather than this being 
complicit with neoliberalism, it can instead be seen as preparing the ground for 
the formulation of a response and a potential alternative. Foucault’s biopolitics 
lectures provide a starting point for this task, but, as argued above, they also 
leave much work for us to do. For while they examine emergent configurations 
between the state and market (ordoliberalism) and the market and the 
individual (the Chicago School), they tell us little, for example, about the practical 
technologies of neoliberal governance and the operation of associated forms of  
or what Wendy Brown calls ‘soft’ power. Here, a key question that takes us 
beyond Foucault, is how neoliberalism is a form of political reason but also more 
than this: what is its organizational basis and how do different trajectories of 
neoliberalism infuse different practices and styles of governance? 
 Does the history of neoliberalism then matter? It might be argued that 
any analysis of neoliberalism should start with the ‘revolution’ that took place 
post-197942 or that we need nothing more than a ‘brief history’ of its 
development.43 But, by looking closely at the emergence of neoliberalism from 
the 1920s onwards it is possible to identify the political, epistemological and 
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organizational bases upon which the neoliberal project is built. By adding into 
and extending Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism and addressing points such 
as the demise of political economy at the end of the nineteenth century and the 
role of Austrian economics, it becomes possible, among other things, to explore 
tensions within the neoliberal project and the political Right more generally that 
otherwise lie concealed. These tensions emerge out of disagreements over key 
questions, such as the exact role that government should play in relation to the 
market, and where the line should be drawn between the state and the market44; 
disagreements that played out in organizations such as the Mont Pèlerin 
Society.45 It is here worth recalling that the purpose of a genealogy, including one 
of neoliberal reason, is to think critically about the lines of descent that lead to 
the present, and to show how things could have, and still can be, otherwise. This 
concern lay at the heart of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France: from the 
first lectures in 1970 on truth46 through to the final lecture series in 1984 that 
turns back to antiquity to explore different conceptions of the self.47 The key 
question that unites these lecture series with Foucault’s history of neoliberalism 
is: ‘what can truth and the self be outside of their current capture by the 
market?’. It is hard to imagine a more pressing question today, in a time in which 
neoliberalism exercises a near-hegemonic grip over contemporary politics and 
culture. Against this backdrop, it is of little significance whether Foucault was 
hostile or sympathetic to neoliberalism; the point instead is to consider the ways 
in which his work can be developed and transcended in order to think 
historically and critically about the limits of neoliberal reason, and, with this, ask 
how things might be otherwise. 
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